Universes in explicit mathematics  by Jäger, Gerhard et al.
Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 109 (2001) 141–162
www.elsevier.com/locate/apal
Universes in explicit mathematics
Gerhard J&agera ;∗, Reinhard Kahleb, Thomas Studera
aInstitut fur Informatik und angewandte Mathematik, Universitat Bern, Neubruckstrasse 10,
CH-3012 Bern, Switzerland
bWilhelm-Schickard-Institut fur Informatik, Universitat Tubingen, Sand 13,
D-72076 Tubingen, Germany
Received 12 November 1999; accepted 28 August 2000
Communicated by S.N. Artemov
Abstract
This paper deals with universes in explicit mathematics. After introducing some basic de2-
nitions, the limit axiom and possible ordering principles for universes are discussed. Later, we
turn to least universes, strictness and name induction. Special emphasis is put on theories for
explicit mathematics with universes which are proof-theoretically equivalent to Feferman’s T0.
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1. Introduction
In some form or another, universes play an important role in many systems of set
theory and higher-order arithmetic, in various formalizations of constructive mathemat-
ics and in logics for computation. One aspect of universes is that they expand the
set or type formation principles in a natural and perspicuous way and provide greater
expressive power and proof-theoretic strength.
The general idea behind universes is quite simple: suppose that we are given a formal
system Th comprising certain set (or type) existence principles which are justi2ed on
speci2c philosophical grounds. Then it may be argued that there should also exist a
collection of sets (or types) – a so-called universe – satisfying these closure conditions.
This process can be iterated, thus establishing stronger and stronger extensions of Th.
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In classical set theory this process is related to what is inherent in the usual reEection
principles yielding the existence of certain large cardinals (cf. e.g. [4]). In theories for
iterated admissible sets, admissibles act as universes and provide for recursive analogues
of large cardinals (cf. e.g. [11]). Universes in Martin–L&of type theory are generated
by speci2c introduction and (sometimes) elimination rules and can be regarded as the
constructive versions of certain regular cardinals. See [21, 25–27] for more information
about this approach.
In the framework of explicit mathematics, universes have 2rst been considered by
Feferman [7] in connection with Hancock’s conjecture and by Marzetta [22] for de-
signing an explicit analogue of Friedman’s theory ATR0 of arithmetic trans2nite re-
cursion (cf. e.g. [9, 28]) and J&ager’s theory KPl0 of iterated admissible sets without
foundation (cf. e.g. [10, 11]). More about universes in explicit mathematics can be
found, for example, in [15, 29], always in connection with theories of predicative or
metapredicative strength. Universes are also crucial for dealing with Mahloness in ex-
plicit mathematics, as shown in the forthcoming paper J&ager and Studer [16]. In [18],
universes are studied for Frege structures, i.e. truth theories corresponding to explicit
mathematics.
The purpose of this article is to clarify several principle aspects of universes in
explicit mathematics and to present them in compact form. After introducing some
basic de2nitions, the limit axiom and possible ordering principles for universes are
discussed. Later we turn to least universes, strictness and name induction. Special
emphasis is put on theories for explicit mathematics with universes which are proof-
theoretically equivalent to Feferman’s T0.
2. Explicit mathematics
Explicit mathematics has been introduced in Feferman [5] as a framework for Bishop
style constructive mathematics. The relationship between explicit mathematics, other
formalizations of constructive mathematics and subsystems of analysis and an inter-
esting interplay between set-theoretic and recursion-theoretic models of explicit math-
ematics have 2rst been studied in [5, 6].
In the following, we do not work with Feferman’s original formalization of systems
of explicit mathematics. Instead, we treat them as theories of types and names as
developed in [12].
Our theories of types and names are formulated in the second-order language L
for individuals and types. It comprises individual variables a; b; c; f; u; v; w; x; y; z; : : :
as well as type variables S; T; U; V;W; X; Y; Z; : : : ; both possibly with subscripts. L also
includes the individual constants k; s (combinators), p; p0; p1 (pairing and projections), 0
(zero), sN (successor), pN (predecessor), dN (de2nition by numerical cases). There are
additional individual constants, called generators, which will be used for the uniform
naming of types, namely nat (natural numbers), id (identity), co (complement), int
(intersection), dom (domain), inv (inverse image), j (join), i (inductive generation) and
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‘ (universe generator). There is one binary function symbol · for (partial) application
of individuals to individuals. Further, L has unary relation symbols ↓ (de2ned) and
N (natural numbers) as well as the three binary relation symbols ∈ (membership), =
(equality) and  (naming, representation).
The individual terms (r; s; t; r1; s1; t1; : : :) of L are built up from individual variables
and individual constants by means of our function symbol · for application. In the
following, we often abbreviate (s · t) simply as (st) or st and adopt the convention of
association to the left so that s1s2 : : : sn stands for (: : : (s1 · s2) : : : sn). Further we put
t′ := sNt.
Usually, we write (s; t) instead of pst and de2ne general n tupling by induction on
n as follows:
(s1) := s1; (s1; : : : ; sn+1) := ((s1; : : : ; sn); sn+1):
The atomic formulas of L are the formulas N(s), s↓, s= t, s ∈ U and (s; U ). Since
we work with a logic of partial terms, it is not guaranteed that all terms have values,
and s↓ is read as s is de;ned or s has a value. Moreover, N(s) says that s is a natural
number, and the formula (s; U ) is used to express that the individual s represents
the type U or is a name of U .
The formulas of L (A; B; C; A1; B1; C1; : : :) are generated from the atomic formulas
by closing against the usual connectives as well as quanti2cation in both sorts. The
following table contains a useful list of abbreviations:
s  t := s ↓ ∨ t↓ → s = t;
s ∈ N := N(s);
(∃x ∈ N)A(x) := (∃x)(x ∈ N ∧ A(x));
(∀x ∈ N)A(x) := (∀x)(x ∈ N→ A(x));
U ⊂V := (∀x)(x ∈ U → x ∈ V );
U = V := U ⊂V ∧ V ⊂U;
s ∈˙ t := (∃X )((t; X ) ∧ s ∈ X );
U ∈˜V := (∃x)((x; U ) ∧ x ∈ V );
(∃ x ∈˙ s)A(x) := (∃x)(x ∈˙ s ∧ A(x));
(∀ x ∈˙ s)A(x) := (∀x)(x ∈˙ s→ A(x));
s =˙ t := (∃X )[(s; X ) ∧ (t; X )];
s ⊂˙ t := (∃X; Y )[(s; X ) ∧ (t; Y ) ∧ X ⊂Y ];
(s) := (∃X )(s; X ):
The vector notation U˜ and s˜ is sometimes used to denote 2nite sequences of type
variables U1; : : : ; Um and individual terms s1; : : : ; sn, respectively, whose lengths are
given by the context. For example, for U˜ =U1; : : : ; Un and s˜= s1; : : : ; sn we write
(˜s; U˜ ) := (s1; U1) ∧ · · · ∧ (sn; Un);
(˜s) := (s1) ∧ · · · ∧ (sn):
The logic of systems of explicit mathematics is Beeson’s classical logic of partial
terms (cf. [1] or [30]) for individuals and classical logic for types.
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Now, we introduce the theory EETJ which provides a framework for explicit
elementary types with join. The non-logical axioms of EETJ can be divided into the
following groups.
(I) Applicative axioms: These axioms formalize that the individuals form a par-
tial combinatory algebra, that we have pairing and projection and the usual closure
conditions on the natural numbers, as well as de2nition by numerical cases:
(1) kab= a,
(2) sab↓∧ sabc  ac(bc),
(3) p0(a; b)= a∧ p1(a; b)= b,
(4) 0 ∈ N∧ (∀x ∈ N)(x′ ∈ N),
(5) (∀x∈N)(x′ =0∧ pN(x′)= x),
(6) (∀x∈N)(x =0→ pNx∈N∧ (pNx)′= x),
(7) a ∈ N∧ b ∈ N∧ a= b→ dNxyab= x,
(8) a ∈ N∧ b ∈ N∧ a = b→ dNxyab=y.
As usual, a theorem about  abstraction and a form of the recursion theorem can be
derived from axioms (1) and (2).
(II) Explicit representation and equality: The following axioms state that each type
has a name, that there are no homonyms and that  respects the extensional equality
of types:
(1) ∃x(x; U ),
(2) (a; U )∧(a; V )→U =V ,
(3) U =V ∧(s; U )→(s; V ).
(III) Basic-type existence axioms: In the following, we provide a 2nite axiomatiza-
tion of uniform elementary comprehension plus join.
Natural numbers
(nat) ∧ ∀x(x ∈˙ nat↔ N(x)).
Identity
(id)∧∀x(x ∈˙ id↔ (∃y)(x = (y; y))).
Complements
(a)→(co(a))∧∀x(x ∈˙ co(a)↔ x =˙∈ a).
Intersections
(a)∧(b)→(int(a; b))∧∀x(x ∈˙ int(a; b)↔ x ∈˙ a∧ x ∈˙ b).
Domains
(a)→(dom(a))∧∀x(x ∈˙ dom(a)↔ ∃y((x; y) ∈˙ a)).
Inverse images
(a)→(inv(a; f))∧∀x(x ∈˙ inv(a; f)↔ fx ∈˙ a).
Joins
(a)∧ (∀x ∈˙ a)(fx)→(j(a; f))∧!(a; f; j(a; f)).
In this last axiom, the formula !(a; f; b) expresses that b names the disjoint union of
f over a, i.e.
!(a; f; b) :=∀x(x ∈˙ b↔ ∃y∃z(x = (y; z) ∧ y ∈˙ a ∧ z ∈˙fy)):
G. Jager et al. / Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 109 (2001) 141–162 145
An L formula A is called elementary if it contains neither the relation symbol  nor
bound type variables. In the original formulation of explicit mathematics, elementary
comprehension is not dealt with by a 2nite axiomatization, but directly as an in2nite
axiom schema. According to a theorem in [8], reformulated in Lemma 1 below, this
schema of uniform elementary comprehension is provable from our 2nite axiomatiza-
tion. Join is not needed for this argument.
In the following, we assume that z1; z2; : : : and Z1; Z2; : : : are arbitrary but 2xed enu-
merations of the individual and type variables of L, respectively. If A is an elementary
L formula with no other individual variables than z1; : : : ; zm and no other type variables
than Z1; : : : ; Zn and if a˜= a1; : : : ; am and S˜ = S1; : : : ; Sn, then we write A[˜a; S˜] for the
L formula which results from A by a simultaneous replacement of zi by ai and Zj by
Sj (16i6m; 06j6n).
Lemma 1 (Elementary comprehension). Let A be an elementary L formula with no
individual variables other than z1; : : : ; z(m + 1) and no type variables other than
Z1; : : : ; Z n. Then there exists a closed individual term t of L; depending on A; so
that EETJ proves for all a˜= a1; : : : ; am; b˜= b1; : : : ; bn and S˜ = S1; : : : ; Sn:
1. (˜b; S˜)→(t(˜a; b˜));
2. (˜b; S˜)→∀x(x ∈˙ t(˜a; b˜)↔A[x; a˜; S˜ ]).
We often informally write {x :B(x)} for the collection of all individuals c such that
B(c). Hence, the previous lemma implies that for elementary L formulas A[u; v˜; W˜ ] one
has
(i) {x :A[x; a˜; S˜ ]} is a type;
(ii) this type can be named, via a closed individual term t of L, in a uniform way
depending on its individual parameters and the names of its type parameters.
For many applications, however, this formulation of elementary comprehension is too
restricted. Below, we therefore present a modi2ed form. Before doing this, however,
we introduce some further convenient shorthand notations.
Let U˜ =U1; : : : ; Un and s˜= s1; : : : ; sn be sequences of type variables and individual
terms of L, respectively, and let A(U˜ ) be an elementary L formula. Then we write A(˜s)
for the L formula which results from A(U˜ ) by replacing for i=1; : : : ; n each occurrence
of t ∈Ui by t ∈˙ si. In addition, given a sequence r˜= r1; : : : ; rm of individual terms of L,
then r˜(˜s) stands for the sequence of individual terms r1(˜s); : : : ; rm(˜s) of L.
Lemma 2 (Modi2ed elementary comprehension). Let A be an elementary L formula
with no individual variables other than z1; : : : ; z(m + 1) and no type variables other
than Z1; : : : ; Z n; and let s˜= s1; : : : ; sn be a sequence of closed individual terms of L.
Then there exists a closed individual term t of L; depending on A and s˜; so that EETJ
proves for all a˜= a1; : : : ; am:
1. (˜s(˜a))→(t(˜a));
2. (˜s(˜a))→∀x(x ∈˙ t(˜a)↔A[x; a˜; s˜(˜a)]).
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In the following, we employ two forms of induction on the natural numbers, type
induction and formula induction. Type induction is the axiom
(T-IN) ∀X (0 ∈ X ∧ (∀x ∈ N)(x ∈ X → x′ ∈ X )→ (∀x ∈ N)(x ∈ X )):
Formula induction, on the other hand, is the schema
(L-IN) A(0) ∧ (∀x ∈ N)(A(x)→ A(x′))→ (∀x ∈ N)A(x)
for each L formula A(u). Sometimes, we also want additional axioms which guarantee
that diOerent generators create diOerent names. This can be achieved by adding, for
example, axioms of the following kind.
Uniqueness of generators with respect to L is given by the collection (L-UG) of
the following axioms for all syntactically diOerent generators r0 and r1 and arbitrary
generators s and t of L:
(1) r0 = r1,
(2) ∀x(sx = nat∧ sx = id),
(3) ∀x∀y(sx= ty→ s= t ∧ x=y).
3. The limit axiom and basic properties of universes
Now we are going to introduce universes in explicit mathematics. In short, a universe
is a type U so that: (i) U is closed under elementary comprehension and join; (ii) all
elements of U are names. This second condition (ii) is crucial to avoid universes from
being trivial since otherwise, for example, the universal type V= {x : x= x} could act
as the topmost universe.
In order to give the de2nition of universe in greater detail, we introduce some
auxiliary notation and let C(S; a) be the closure condition which is the disjunction of
the following L formulas:
(1) a= nat∨ a= id;
(2) ∃x(a= co(x)∧ x∈ S);
(3) ∃x∃y(a= int(x; y)∧ x∈ S ∧y∈ S);
(4) ∃x(a= dom(x)∧ x∈ S);
(5) ∃f∃x(a= inv(f; x)∧ x∈ S);
(6) ∃x∃f[a= j(x; f)∧ x∈ S ∧ (∀y ∈˙ x)(fy∈ S)].
Thus the formula ∀x(C(S; x)→ x∈ S) describes that S is a type which is closed under
the type constructions of EETJ, i.e. elementary comprehension and join. A universe is
a type which consists of names only and satis2es this closure condition.
Denition 3. (1) We write U(S) to express that the type S is a universe,
U(S) := ∀x(C(S; x)→ x ∈ S) ∧ (∀x ∈ S)(x):
(2) U(t) means that the individual t is a name of a universe,
U(t) := ∃X ((t; X ) ∧ U(X )):
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It follows immediately from this de2nition that one can work within universes as in
EETJ; in particular, there is an analogue of Lemma 1 relativized to all universes.
Lemma 4 (Modi2ed elementary comprehension in universes). Let A be an elementary
L formula with no individual variables other than z1; : : : ; z(m + 1) and no type vari-
ables other than Z1; : : : ; Z n; and let s˜= s1; : : : ; sn be a sequence of closed individual
terms of L. Then there exists a closed individual term t of L; depending on A and s˜;
so that EETJ proves for all a˜= a1; : : : ; am:
1. U(S)∧ s˜(˜a)∈ S→ t(˜a)∈ S;
2. (˜s(˜a))→∀x(x ∈˙ t(˜a)↔A[x; a˜; s˜(˜a)]).
We now observe that universes do not contain their names; for a proof see Marzetta
[22]. This property of universes corresponds in a certain sense to the set-theoretic fact
that admissibles do not contain themselves, even if ∈ foundation is not available.
Lemma 5. In EETJ; one can prove that
U(S) ∧ (a; S)→ a =∈ S:
Note that in explicit mathematics, the names of a type do not form a type. This
is proved in various places, for example in [3, 13, 17]; join is not needed for this
argument. In connection with universes, a stronger result is possible: each type has so
many names that not all of them can be contained in a single universe, or, in other
words, no universe is large enough to contain all names of a given type (see also [24]).
Lemma 6. In EETJ; one can prove that
U(S)→ ∃x((x; T ) ∧ x =∈ S):
Proof. Let S be a universe and choose a name a of S. Then j(a; x :x) is a name of
the type
U = {(x; y) : x ∈ S ∧ y ∈˙ x}: (1)
The next step is to prove the equivalence
(b; T )↔ ∀x(x ∈˙ b↔ x ∈ T ) (2)
for all b∈ S. The direction from left to right is obvious. To establish the converse
direction, let b be an element of S. Then b is a name of a type V since all elements
of universes are names. Hence we have (b; V ), and the right-hand side of (2) yields
T =V . Thus we conclude (b; T ).
For all b∈ S, we derive from (1) and (2) that
(b; T )↔ ∀x((b; x) ∈ U ↔ x ∈ T ):
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Since the right-hand side of this equivalence is elementary, elementary comprehension
gives the type
W = {x : x ∈ S ∧ (x; T )}:
If all names of T were contained in S, then W would be the type of all names of T .
But, in view of the remark above, this is not possible.
The theory EETJ does not prove the existence of universes. However, as in the case
of theories for admissible sets (cf. e.g. [11]), a so-called limit axiom can easily be
added. By making use of the generator ‘, one assigns to each name x the name ‘x of
a universe containing x, i.e.
(Lim) ∀x((x)→ U(‘x) ∧ x ∈˙ ‘x):
The standard model constructions of J&ager and Strahm [15] for metapredicative and
J&ager and Studer [16] for impredicative Mahlo provide natural models for (Lim). The
proof-theoretic strengths of (Lim) in the context of elementary comprehension and
join plus type or formula induction on the natural numbers have been analyzed in
[19, 29]. Although, in many situations, (Lim) is proof-theoretically equivalent to its
obvious non-uniform version as studied in [22, 23], sometimes there are subtle diOer-
ences between (Lim) and its nonuniform version, which will be discussed elsewhere.
There are, of course, many universes which contain a given name a. The universe
named by ‘a can be regarded as the standard or normal universe and ‘a as its normal
name.
Denition 7. We write U‘(t) to express that the individual t is a normal name of a
universe,
U‘(t) := ∃x((x) ∧ t = ‘x):
A 2rst simple observation concerning the generator ‘ says that for all names a, the
type named by a and the type named by ‘a have to be diOerent.
Lemma 8. In EETJ+ (Lim); one can prove that
∀x((x)→ x ˙= ‘x):
Proof. Let a be a name. Because of (Lim), we know that ‘a is a name of a universe
S which contains a. According to Lemma 5, this ‘a cannot be an element of S. Hence
a ˙= ‘a.
Simple generators like co and int are extensional in the sense that a =˙ b and u =˙ v
imply co(a) =˙ co(b) and int(a; u) =˙ int(b; v). The following lemma shows that such a
form of extensionality is not the case for the generator ‘.
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Lemma 9. In EETJ+ (Lim); one can prove that
∃x∃y((x) ∧ (y) ∧ x =˙y ∧ ‘x ˙= ‘y):
Proof. Choose an arbitrary type T and a name a of T . Then ‘a is a name of a universe
S which contains a. Because of Lemma 6, there exists a name b of T which does not
belong to S, i.e. b =˙∈ ‘a. Now consider ‘a and ‘b. Both are names of universes, but
since b ∈˙ ‘b and b =˙∈ ‘a we have ‘a ˙= ‘b. On the other hand, a =˙ b since both are
names of T .
Now we turn to possible “ordering principles” for universes. Motivated by the fa-
miliar set-theoretic situation, we begin with considering linearity, transitivity and con-
nectivity of universes which are formulated in our context as follows:
(U-Lin) ∀X∀Y (U(X ) ∧ U(Y )→ X ∈˜Y ∨ X = Y ∨ Y ∈˜X );
(U-Tran) ∀X∀Y (U(X ) ∧ U(Y ) ∧ X ∈˜Y → X ⊂Y );
(U-Con) ∀X∀Y (U(X ) ∧ U(Y )→ X ⊂Y ∨ Y ⊂X ):
Although these three assertions may appear natural, they are problematic in our context.
For example, they are not valid in the standard model of J&ager and Studer [16] and
incompatible, as we will see now, with uniqueness of generators.
In the proof of the following theorem, we exploit the fact that suitably constructed
universes remain universes if certain elements are taken out. For this sort of argu-
ment, it is important that we have a criterion for testing whether a type is a universe.
If universes were introduced by an implicit de2nition, such an argument would hardly
work.
Theorem 10. (1) In EETJ; one can prove that
(U-Con)→ (U-Tran):
(2) In EETJ+ (Lim) + (L-UG); one can prove that
¬(U-Lin) ∧ ¬(U-Tran) ∧ ¬(U-Con):
Proof. For the proof of the 2rst assertion, take two universes S and T with S ∈˜T . Then
T ⊂ S since T contains a name of S which cannot be an element of S by Lemma 5.
Therefore, (U-Con) implies S ⊂T , completing the proof of the 2rst assertion.
Now we work in the theory EETJ + (Lim) + (L-UG). In order to show ¬(U-Lin),
we let S be the universe named by ‘(‘(nat)) and T the type S\{‘(nat)}. Then T is
properly contained in S. Moreover, because of the uniqueness of generators, T is a
universe. Now we apply Lemma 5 and derive S =˜∈T from T ⊂ S. It only remains to
check that T =˜∈ S, or equivalently,
(∀x ∈ S)¬(x; T ):
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If a is in S, then co(co(a)) is also an element of S and a =˙ co(co(a)). The unique-
ness of generators and the de2nition of T therefore yield co(co(a))∈T . We apply
Lemma 5 again and conclude that co(co(a)) is not a name of T . But a and co(co(a))
name the same type so that a cannot be a name of T . Hence we have T =˜∈ S and
therefore also ¬(U-Lin).
The proof of ¬(U-Tran) follows the same pattern. In this case we choose R to be
the universe named by ‘(‘(nat)), S to be the universe named by ‘(‘(‘(nat))) and
T to be the type S\{‘(nat)}. It is ‘(nat) = ‘(‘(nat)) according to Lemma 8. Hence
‘(‘(nat))∈T . Therefore R ∈˜T . In addition, we have ‘(nat)∈R which implies R ⊂T .
Therefore, ¬(U-Tran) is proved. Owing to the 2rst assertion of this theorem, we also
have ¬(U-Con).
This lemma makes it clear that there are too many universes – universes that are
not generated by ‘ – which violate linearity, transitivity and connectivity. As a con-
sequence, we claim linearity, transitivity and connectivity only for normal (names of)
universes. These restricted versions are natural, suRcient for all practical purposes and
justi2ed by the standard model construction of J&ager and Studer [16]. Therefore our
“oRcial” formulations are:
(U‘-Lin) ∀x∀y(U‘(x) ∧U‘(y)→ x ∈˙y ∨ x := y ∨ y ∈˙ x);
(U‘-Tran) ∀x∀y(U‘(x) ∧U‘(y) ∧ x ∈˙y → x ⊂˙y);
(U‘-Con) ∀x∀y(U‘(x ∧U‘(y)→ x ⊂˙y ∨ y ⊂˙ x):
According to the following lemma, (U‘-Tran) is provable in every theory of the form
Th + (Lim) + (U‘-Con), provided that Th comprises EETJ; therefore, it need not be
included in the list of axioms. To be more precise: EETJ+ (Lim) + (U‘-Con) proves
(U‘-Tran), and EETJ + (Lim) + (U‘-Lin) proves the equivalence of (U‘-Con) and
(U‘-Tran).
Lemma 11. In EETJ+ (Lim) + (U‘-Con); one can prove that
∀x∀y∀z(U‘(x) ∧U‘(y) ∧ z := x ∧ z ∈˙y → x ⊂˙y):
Since this formula is a (useful) generalization of (U‘-Tran); (U‘-Tran) is also prov-
able in EETJ+ (Lim) + (U‘-Con).
Proof. Assume that a is a normal name of the universe S, b a normal name of the
universe T , a =˙ c and c∈T . Then c is also a name of S and, therefore, we have c =∈ S
according to Lemma 5. Hence T is not contained in S. Because of (U‘-Con), we thus
have S ⊂T .
The most famous system of explicit mathematics is the theory T0 introduced in [5].
It is obtained from EETJ+(L-IN) by adding the principle of inductive generation (IG).
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As a helpful abbreviation, we write
Closed(a; b; S) := (∀x ∈˙ a)[(∀y ∈˙ a)((y; x) ∈˙ b→ y ∈ S)→ x ∈ S]:
Consider b as the code of a binary relation. Then this de2nition means that S is a
type which contains a c ∈˙ a if all predecessors of c in a with respect to b belong to S.
Inductive generation (IG) is now given by the following axioms:
(IG:1) (a) ∧ (b)→ ∃X ((i(a; b); X ) ∧ Closed(a; b; X ));
(IG:2) (a) ∧ (b) ∧ Closed(a; b; A)→ (∀x ∈˙ i(a; b))A(x)
for all L formulas A(u). Thus (IG), i.e. (IG:1)+(IG:2), states the existence of accessible
parts and, again, everything is uniform in the corresponding names. As mentioned
before, Feferman’s T0 is given by
T0 := EETJ+ (L-IN) + (IG):
Space does not permit us to discuss the semantics of theories for explicit mathematics
with universes and to present some standard model constructions. This issue is treated
in some detail in [16] for impredicative systems and in [15] for their (meta)predicative
variants. These articles also contain the proof-theoretic analysis of a series of theories
for explicit mathematics with universes.
Some relevant results are listed in the following theorem. Parts one and two follow
from J&ager and Studer [16]. For parts three and four, see [29, 19]. The 2xed point
theory ÎD¡! is studied in [7]. Trans2nitely iterated 2xed point theories are introduced
and analyzed in [14].
Theorem 12. (1) The theory T0 +(Lim)+(L-UG)+(U‘-Lin)+(U‘-Con) is consistent
and of the same proof-theoretic strength as T0.
(2) This proof-theoretic equivalence remains true if; on both sides; inductive gen-
eration or complete induction on the natural numbers plus inductive generation are
restricted to types.
(3) The theory EETJ+ (Lim) + (U‘-Lin) + (U‘-Con) + (L-IN) is proof-theoretically
equivalent to ÎD¡”0 .
(4) Moreover; if complete induction on the natural numbers in the previous system
is restricted to types; then the resulting theory is proof-theoretically equivalent to
ÎD¡! and ATR0.
The model constructions in [19, 29] employed for establishing the proof-theoretic
upper bounds of EETJ+ (Lim) + (U‘-Lin) + (U‘-Con) plus type or formula induction
on the natural numbers can easily be adapted to satisfying (L-UG) as well. Hence, the
addition of uniqueness of generators with respect to L to these two theories does not
increase their respective proof-theoretic strength.
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4. Least universes
The limit axiom (Lim) claims that every name a is contained in a normal universe
named by ‘a. It does not claim, however, that this universe is a minimal or least uni-
verse containing a. In this section we want more and introduce the theory LUN which
requires each name to be element of a least universe. Then we deal with consequences
of the existence of least universes.
In the following, we make a careful distinction between the normal universes consid-
ered in the previous section and the least universes to be generated now. Accordingly,
LUN is formulated in the language L′ which is the variant of L using the generator lt
instead of the generator ‘; the generator i is not needed in L′. The L′ formulas and
other syntactic categories of L′ are de2ned in analogy to those of L.
The axioms of LUN are the axioms of EETJ formulated for L′, uniqueness of genera-
tors (L′-UG) with respect to the language L′, the schema (L′-IN) of complete induction
on the natural numbers for all L′ formulas plus the following leastness axioms:
(L:1) ∀x((x)→ U(lt(x)) ∧ x ∈˙ lt(x));
(L:2) ∀x[(x) ∧ ∀y(C(A; y)→ A(y)) ∧ A(x)→ (∀y ∈˙ lt(x))A(y)]
for all L′ formulas A(u). Schema (L:2) is an induction principle establishing that there
are no de2nable proper subcollections of the type with name lt(a) with the closure
properties of a universe and a as an element.
The proof of the following lemma, which lists some further properties of the gener-
ator lt, is straightforward and left to the reader. The uniqueness of generators (L′-UG)
with respect to L′ is used several times.
Lemma 13. In LUN; one can prove
1. (a)∧(lt(a); S)→∀x[(C(S; x)∨ x= a)↔ x∈ S];
2. (a)∧ lt(b) ∈˙ lt(a)→ lt(b)= a;
3. a =˙ b→ lt(a) =˙∈ lt(b);
4. (a)→ a ˙= lt(a);
5. (a)∧ j(b; f) ∈˙ lt(a)∧ a = j(b; f)→ b ∈˙ lt(a)∧ (∀x ∈˙ b)(fx ∈˙ lt(a)):
Taking up the arguments of the previous section one immediately sees that (U-Lin),
(U-Tran) and (U-Con) are inconsistent with LUN. However, the situation is even worse
in LUN with reference to our ordering principles for universes: even linearity, transi-
tivity and connectivity for normal names are inconsistent. In analogy to EETJ+(Lim),
normal (names of) universes are de2ned in LUN by
Ult(x) := ∃y((y) ∧ x = lt(y)):
Linearity (Ult-Lin), transitivity (Ult-Tran) and connectivity (Ult-Con) of normal names
of universes are then formulated as expected.
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Theorem 14. In LUN; one can prove that
¬(Ult-Lin) ∧ ¬(Ult-Tran) ∧ ¬(Ult-Con):
Proof. Let a be the name lt(nat) and S the universe named by a. Now choose a
diOerent name b of S. Then lt(a) =˙∈ lt(b) and lt(b) =˙∈ lt(a) follow from the third part of
Lemma 13. Since a is the term lt(nat), the second part of this lemma yields a =˙∈ lt(b).
Hence, we also have lt(a) ˙= lt(b), and ¬(Ult-Lin) is proved.
We continue by de2ning c to be the name lt(a). This implies lt(a) ∈˙ lt(c). Fur-
thermore, in view of the second and the fourth part of Lemma 13, it is also true
that lt(nat) =˙∈ lt(c). From lt(nat)= a ∈˙ lt(a), we thus conclude that lt(a) ˙⊂ lt(c). Hence
¬(Ult-Tran).
To 2nish the proof of this theorem, we can proceed as in the proof of Theorem 10
and derive ¬(Ult-Con) from the just shown ¬(Ult-Tran) and the fact that (Ult-Con)
implies (Ult-Tran).
Our next aim is to show that inductive generation (IG) can be handled in LUN.
The basic idea is to make use of the induction schema (L:2) of LUN for dealing with the
induction schema of inductive generation. Please keep in mind the de2nition of the
formula Closed(a; b; X ) in the previous section.
Theorem 15. There exists a closed individual term acc of L′ so that LUN proves for
arbitrary L′ formulas A(u):
1. (a)∧(b)→(acc(a; b));
2. (a)∧(b)→Closed(a; b; acc(a; b));
3. (a)∧(b)∧Closed(a; b; A)→ (∀x ∈˙ acc(a; b))A(x):
Proof. We begin by introducing some notation. Given two types U and V , we write
U unionmulti V for the disjoint union of U and V and Pred(U; V; w) for the type of the
predecessors of w in U with respect to V ,
U unionmulti V := {(0; x) : x ∈ U} ∪ {(1; x) : x ∈ V};
pred(U; V; w) := {x : x ∈ U ∧ (x; w) ∈ V}:
Elementary comprehension shows that U unionmulti V and Pred(U; V; w) are types. Moreover,
because of Lemma 4, there are even closed terms du and pd for which LUN proves:
(u; U ) ∧ (v; V )→ (du(u; v); U unionmulti V ); (1)
U(W ) ∧ u ∈ W ∧ v ∈ W → du(u; v) ∈ W; (2)
(u; U ) ∧ (v; V )→ (pd(u; v; w); Pred(U; V; w)); (3)
U(W ) ∧ (u) ∧ (v) ∧ du(u; v) ∈ W → pd(u; v; w) ∈ W: (4)
Because of the uniqueness of generators du can even be chosen so that du(u; v) is
diOerent from j(w;f) for arbitrary u; v; w and f.
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The next step is an application of the recursion theorem for placing a closed term t
at our disposal with
t(u; v; w)  j(pd(u; v; w); z:t(u; v; z)) (5)
for all u; v and w. Making use of this term t and the generator lt, we can now apply
modi2ed elementary comprehension (cf. Lemma 2) in order to obtain a closed term
acc so that acc(u; v) uniformly names the type
{x : x ∈˙ u ∧ t(u; v; x) ∈˙ lt(du(u; v))};
provided that u and v are names, i.e.
(u) ∧ (v)→ (acc(u; v)); (6)
(u) ∧ (v)→ ∀x[x ∈˙ acc(u; v)↔ x ∈˙ u ∧ t(u; v; x) ∈˙ lt(du(u; v))]: (7)
Thus, the 2rst assertion of our theorem is obviously satis2ed. To deal with the second
assertion, assume (a), (b) and (acc(a; b); S); we have to show Closed(a; b; S). To
this end, take an individual c ∈˙ a with the property
(∀x ∈˙ a)((x; c) ∈˙ b→ x ∈ S):
From this we conclude that
∀x(x ∈˙ pd(a; b; c)→ t(a; b; x) ∈˙ lt(du(a; b))):
Together with (4), the closure properties of universes and Eq. (5) we obtain
t(a; b; c)  j(pd(a; b; c); z:t(a; b; z)) ∈˙ lt(du(a; b)):
Therefore, c is an element of S, and the proof of Closed(a; b; S) is complete. Hence,
the second assertion of our theorem is established as well.
Before turning to the proof of the third assertion, which requires a bit more eOort,
we show two auxiliary assertions (A) and (B).
(A) (u)∧(v)∧w ∈˙ acc(u; v)→ (∀x ∈˙ pd(u; v; w))(x ∈˙ acc(u; v)).
Proof of (A). Let u and v be names. Then w ∈˙ acc(u; v) implies in view of Eq. (5)
and property (7) that
j(pd(u; v; w); z:t(u; v; z)) ∈˙ lt(du(u; v)):
Remember that du(u; v) is diOerent from j(pd(u; v; w); z:t(u; v; z)) according to our
choice of du. Hence, assertion 5 of Lemma 13 yields
(∀x ∈˙ pd(u; v; w))(t(u; v; x) ∈˙ lt(du(u; v))):
Thus, we have (∀x ∈˙ pd(u; v; w))(x ∈˙ acc(u; v)), and the proof of the 2rst auxiliary
assertion (A) is complete.
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Depending on the closed terms t and acc and the parameters u and v, we now de2ne
for each L′ formula A(w) an L′ formula BA(u; v; w) which helps to reduce the closure
principle of inductive generation to the closure condition for universes,
BA(u; v; w) := ∀y(y ∈˙ acc(u; v)∧w = t(u; v; y)→ A(y)):
(B) (u)∧(v)∧Closed(u; v; A)∧C(BA(u; v; :); w)→BA(u; v; w).
Proof of (B). Assuming the left-hand side of this implication, we have to show that
A(c) follows from
c ∈˙ acc(u; v) ∧ w= t(u; v; c) (8)
for all c. So we also assume (8). Then Eq. (5) implies
w = j(pd(u; v; c); z:t(u; v; z)):
Hence, the uniqueness of generators and C(BA(u; v; :); w) yield
(∀x ∈˙ pd(u; v; c))BA(u; v; t(u; v; x));
and the de2nition of BA therefore implies
(∀x ∈˙ pd(u; v; c))∀y(y ∈˙ acc(u; v) ∧ t(u; v; x) = t(u; v; y)→ A(y)):
From this we immediately obtain
(∀x ∈˙ pd(u; v; c))(x ∈˙ acc(u; v)→ A(x)):
Because of c ∈˙ acc(u; v), applying (A) gives (∀x ∈˙ pd(u; v; c))A(x) and, therefore, A(c)
follows from Closed(u; v; A). Thus (B) is proved.
Now we are ready for the third assertion of our theorem. Take an arbitrary L′
formula A(u) and assume (a), (b), (acc(a; b); S) and Closed(a; b; A). We apply
the auxiliary assertion (B) and obtain
∀x(C(BA(a; b; :); x)→ BA(a; b; x)):
Because of the uniqueness of generators, we also have BA(a; b; du(a; b)). Thus, the
leastness principle (L:2) yields (∀x ∈˙ lt(du(a; b)))BA(a; b; x). Hence, by the de2nition
of BA, we conclude that
(∀x ∈˙ lt(du(a; b)))∀y(y ∈˙ acc(a; b) ∧ x = t(a; b; y)→ A(y)):
Since acc(a; b) is a name of S and t(a; b; c) ∈˙ lt(du(a; b)) for all elements c of S, it
follows (∀x ∈ S)A(x). This 2nishes the proof of the third assertion of our theorem.
This theorem provides the desired reduction of T0 to LUN: (i) the language L is
translated into the language L′ by interpreting the generator i of L as the closed indi-
vidual term acc of L′ and leaving the remaining vocabulary unchanged; (ii) then the
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translations of all instances of inductive generation obtained in this way are provable in
LUN according to the previous theorem; (iii) the (translations of the) remaining axioms
of T0 are obviously provable in LUN. A careful inspection of the previous proof also
establishes the second part of the following corollary.
Corollary 16. The theory T0 is contained in LUN. Moreover; the subsystems of T0
which are obtained by restricting inductive generation or complete induction on the
natural numbers plus inductive generation to types are contained in the corresponding
subsystems of LUN.
5. Embedding of LUN into T0 + (Lim) + (L-UG)
In the previous section, we have shown how T0 can be embedded into LUN. There-
fore, we have a lower bound for the proof-theoretic strength of LUN. It remains to be
proved that this bound is sharp. This aim will be achieved by interpreting LUN into
the extension T0 +(Lim)+(L-UG) of T0 and by exploiting a result of J&ager and Studer
[16] implying the proof-theoretic equivalence of T0 and T0 + (Lim) + (L-UG).
The crucial step in the interpretation of LUN into T0+(Lim)+(L-UG) is to construct
a closed term lst of the language L so that for each name a the term lst(a) names,
provable in T0 + (Lim) + (L-UG), the least universe containing a. In general, the
generator ‘ will not do this job since the universe denoted by ‘a may be too big. And
we know more: according to Theorem 14, it is inconsistent with T0 + (Lim) + (L-UG)
and linearity, transitivity or connectivity of normal names to assume that each ‘a is a
name of the least universe containing a.
For de2ning the closed term lst we proceed as follows: given a name a, we go
over to the normal universe provided by ‘a. Then we use inductive generation on
this universe in order to single out those names which are absolutely needed for a
universe containing a. This means we employ a binary relation on the universe (named
by) ‘a according to the “date of generation” of the respective names. Because of the
uniqueness of generators, the history of the elements of ‘a relevant for this construction
is well-determined in the theory T0 + (Lim) + (L-UG).
Now, we de2ne an L formula @a which says that b and c are elements of the universe
‘a and b comes before c in the inductive build up of the least universe containing a.
Let Bef(a; b; c) be the disjunction of the following formulas:
(1) c= co(b),
(2) ∃x(c= int(b; x)∨ c= int(x; b)),
(3) c= dom(b),
(4) ∃f(c= inv(f; b)),
(5) ∃f(c= j(b; f)),
(6) ∃x∃y∃f(c= j(x; f)∧ (x; y) ∈˙ j(‘a; z:z)∧ b=fy).
Then we set
b @a c := b ∈˙ ‘a ∧ c ∈˙ ‘a ∧ c = a ∧ Bef(a; b; c):
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Remember that the subformula (x; y) ∈˙ j(‘a; z:z) in clause (6) is equivalent to x ∈˙ ‘a∧
y ∈˙ x. Hence (6) is the same as the more familiar
∃x∃y∃f(c= j(x; f) ∧ x ∈˙ ‘a ∧ y ∈˙ x ∧ b=fy);
saying that b is one of the “predecessors” of c in the case that c is generated by
join. The name a itself is considered as an urelement of the least universe containing
a; therefore we have the condition c = a in the de2nition of b@a c for ruling out the
possibility that a has @a predecessors.
The candidates for the least universe containing a are a itself, the constants nat as
well as id and all names b with at least one element before b and all such belonging
to ‘a,
Cand(a; b) :=
{
(b = a ∨ b = nat ∨ b = id)∨
(∃xBef(a; x; b) ∧ ∀x(Bef(a; x; b)→ x ∈˙ ‘a)):
All other individuals cannot belong to the least universe containing a. When applying
inductive generation, this can be achieved by postulating that the corresponding ac-
cessibility relation is reEexive on the non-candidates. A candidate, on the other hand,
goes into the intended inductively generated type whenever all its @a predecessors are
elements of this type.
From Lemma 2 about modi2ed elementary comprehension, we conclude that, for
every name a, there exists a type coding the intended accessibility relation,
Ar(a) := {(x; y) : (x = y ∧ ¬Cand(a; y)) ∨ (x @a y ∧ Cand(a; y))}:
This lemma also implies that in EETJ, there is a closed individual term ar of L which
uniformly describes this assignment of the type Ar(a) to the name a, i.e. EETJ proves
(a)→ (ar(a);Ar(a)):
We 2nish the uniform construction of the least universe containing the name a in
T0 + (Lim) + (L-UG) by carrying through inductive generation on the type with name
‘a along the relation coded by Ar(a),
lst := z:i(‘z; ar(z)):
Thus lst(a) is i(‘a; ar(a)). The following theorem shows that the closed term lst pro-
duces for each name a the least universe containing a.
Theorem 17. For each L formula A(u) one can prove in T0 + (Lim) + (L-UG):
1. (a)→U(lst(a))∧ a ∈˙ lst(a);
2. (a)∧∀x(C(A; x)→A(x))∧A(a)→ (∀x ∈˙ lst(a))A(x).
Proof. In view of the preceding remarks, the proof of the 2rst assertion should be more
or less obvious. For showing the second assertion, suppose (a), ∀x(C(A; x)→ A(x))
and A(a). Then some intermediate calculations yield Closed(‘a; ar(a); A). From this
we conclude (∀x ∈˙ lst(a))A(x) by the induction principle of inductive generation.
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We simply translate the language L′ of LUN into the language L of T0 + (Lim) +
(L-UG) by interpreting the generator lt of L′ by the closed term lst of L. Hence, the
previous theorem yields the translation of the axioms (L:1) and (L:2). The treatment
of the other axioms of LUN in T0 + (Lim) + (L-UG) is unproblematic.
Corollary 18. The theory LUN is contained in T0 + (Lim) + (L-UG). Moreover; the
subsystems of LUN which are obtained by restricting (L:2) or complete induction on
the natural numbers plus (L:2) to types are contained in the corresponding subsystems
of T0 + (Lim) + (L-UG).
6. Name strictness
When considering the predicate  in the theory EETJ + (Lim), we see that names
are built up by the use of the generators nat, id, co, int, dom, inv, j and the universe
generator ‘. However, there is no restriction on whether other terms can belong to 
as well. For example, if co(a) is a name, then there is in general no need for a being
a name, too.
In this section, we discuss the notion of name strictness of types stating that the
(appropriate) arguments s1; : : : ; sn of a generator r have to be elements of the name
strict type W , provided that r(s1; : : : ; sn) belongs to W . This notion is analogue to the
strictness of de2nedness, implemented in the logic of partial terms, and the so-called
N-strictness for the natural numbers, discussed in [20]. By reEecting name strictness
on universes, one obtains name strict universes. In the next section, we introduce
a form of name induction saying that all names have to be constructed by the use
of generators. Adding name induction to the theory of name strict universes proves
inductive generation and yields, thereby, an alternative to LUN.
Name strictness depends on the generators which are available in the underlying
language. But since we discuss name strictness only in connection with the language
L, we do not mention this dependence and simply write Str(W ) for the conjunction of
the following formulas:
(1) ∀x(co(x)∈W → x∈W );
(2) ∀x∀y(int(x; y)∈W → x∈W ∧y∈W );
(3) ∀x(dom(x)∈W → x∈W );
(4) ∀f∀x(inv(f; x)∈W → x∈W );
(5) ∀x∀f(j(x; f)∈W → x∈W ∧ (∀y ∈˙ x)(fy∈W ));
(6) ∀x∀y(i(x; y)∈W → x∈W ∧y∈W );
(7) ∀x(‘(x)∈W → x∈W ):
Accordingly, a type W is called a strict universe if it is a universe and if it satis2es
the condition Str(W ).
Denition 19. (1) We write SU(W ) to express that the type W is a name strict
universe,
SU(W ) := U(W ) ∧ Str(W ):
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(2) We write SU(t) to express that the individual t is a name of a name strict
universe,
SU(t) := ∃X ((t; X ) ∧ SU(X )):
Our old limit axiom (Lim) postulates that every name a belongs to a universe which
is named ‘a. In the context of name strictness, this axiom is now replaced by the
corresponding limit axiom for name strict universes,
(sLim) ∀x((x)→SU(‘(x)) ∧ x∈˙‘(x)):
Our de2nition of universe is too general for requiring that all universes are name strict.
Following the pattern of the proof of Theorem 10 it is easy to see that, at least in the
presence of (L-UG), there are universes that are not name strict.
Lemma 20. In EETJ+ (sLim) + (L-UG); one can prove that
∃X (U(X ) ∧ ¬SU(X )):
Proof. Let S be the universe which is named by ‘(‘(‘(nat))), and let T be the type
S\{‘(nat)}. As in the proof of Theorem 10, we realize that T is a universe. However,
T obviously does not contain the element ‘(nat), although it contains ‘(‘(nat)). Hence
T is not name strict.
The model construction of J&ager and Studer [16] shows that all proof-theoretic equiv-
alences mentioned in the 2rst two parts of Theorem 12 remain true if we replace the
limit axiom (Lim) by our new axiom (sLim). The same should be the case for parts
three and four of that theorem.
We end this section with a simple example which illustrates the usefulness of name
strict universes. Suppose that we want a universe which contains two given names a
and b. In the presence of (sLim) we can proceed as follows. We 2rst select the name
du(a; b) of the disjoint union of the types named by a and b (cf. proof of Theorem 15).
Then we form ‘(du(a; b)). Because of name strictness, it is easy to check that the
universe with this name contains a and b. If only the axiom (Lim) is available, then
‘(du(a; b)) can be formed as well, but now we cannot conclude that a ∈˙ ‘(du(a; b))
and b∈˙‘(du(a; b)). It merely follows that there are names a′; b′∈˙‘(du(a; b)) so that
a′ =˙ a and b′ =˙ b.
7. Name induction
As an alternative to least universes, we can add name induction to the theory
EETJ + (sLim) + (L-UG) to obtain inductive generation. Name induction claims that
the elements of  are built up by the use of generators only. In a certain sense it can
be understood as an intensional version of ∈ induction.
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In order to state the axiom schema of name induction, we introduce the closure
condition C‘(S; a) which extends C(S; a) by a new clause for the universe generator ‘,
C‘(S; a) := C(S; a) ∨ ∃x(a = ‘x ∧ x ∈ S):
The type existence axioms of EETJ + (Lim) and EETJ + (sLim) guarantee that the
names are closed under this closure condition,
∀x(C‘(; x)→ (x)):
The schema of name induction on the other hand, is the principle that there are no
de2nable subcollections of the names with this closure property. It is given by
(L-I) ∀x(C‘(A; x)→ A(x))→ ∀x((x)→ A(x))
for all L formulas A(u). This form of name induction will be considered now in the
context of EETJ with the strict limit axiom, uniqueness of generators and the schema
of complete induction on the natural numbers,
NAI := EETJ+ (sLim) + (L-UG) + (L-IN) + (L-I):
As an immediate consequence of name induction we obtain the name strictness of the
predicate (u). The proof of the following lemma is routine work; name strictness of
the limit axiom and complete induction on the natural numbers are not needed.
Lemma 21. In NAI; one can prove that Str().
In the proof of Theorem 15 which provides for inductive generation in the theory
LUN, we made essential use of the 2fth assertion of Lemma 13. Working in the theory
NAI, an even slightly stronger property follows immediately from the name strictness
of normal universes.
Lemma 22. In NAI; one can prove that
(a) ∧ j(b; f) ∈˙ ‘a→ b ∈˙ ‘a ∧ (∀x ∈˙ b)(fx ∈˙ ‘a):
With this lemma available, we can now simulate inductive generation in the theory
NAI in the same way as we did it in LUN.
Theorem 23. There exists a closed individual term ig of L so that NAI proves for
arbitrary L formulas A(u):
1: (a)∧(b)→(ig(a; b));
2: (a)∧(b)→Closed(a; b; ig(a; b));
3: (a)∧(b)∧Closed(a; b; A)→ (∀x∈˙ig(a; b))A(x):
Proof. This proof is literally the same as the proof of Theorem 15, provided that we
make the following changes: instead of the generator lt, we use the generator ‘ and
instead of the induction schema (L:2), we apply name induction (L-I).
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Since the generator i does not play any role in the theory NAI, it has no function
for the embedding of T0 + (sLim); the part of the generator i in T0 + (sLim) is taken
over by the just de2ned closed term ig. Hence, if A∗ is the L formula which results
from the L formula A by replacing all occurrences of i by ig, we see that NAI proves
A∗ for all axioms A of T0 + (sLim).
Corollary 24. The theory T0 + (sLim) is contained in NAI. Moreover; the subsystems
of T0 + (sLim) which are obtained by restricting inductive generation or complete
induction on the natural numbers plus inductive generation to types are contained in
the corresponding subsystems of NAI.
For determining the upper proof-theoretic bounds of NAI, we refer again to the
model construction in [6]. It follows that NAI, together with the axioms (U‘-Lin) and
(U‘-Con), is valid in this model. The results of [16] thus show that the proof-theoretic
strength of NAI+ (U‘-Lin) + (U‘-Con) cannot be greater than that of T0.
We conclude this article by recapitulating several results concerning theories of ex-
plicit mathematics with universes. One important aspect is that the addition of (Lim)
or (sLim) plus certain ordering principles for normal universes does not increase the
proof-theoretic strength of T0; another observation says that inductive generation can
be replaced by leastness of universes or name induction.
Conclusion 25. The following theories with universes have the same proof-theoretic
strength as the theory T0:
1. T0 + (Lim) and T0 + (Lim) + (U‘-Lin) + (U‘-Con),
2. T0 + (sLim) and T0 + (sLim) + (U‘-Lin) + (U‘-Con),
3. LUN, NAI and NAI+ (U‘-Lin) + (U‘-Con).
Name induction added to EETJ+(L-UG)+ (L-IN) yields a theory of explicit mathe-
matics which is proof-theoretically equivalent to ID1. The lower bound is established by
embedding the theory ID1(acc) of accessible parts (cf. e.g. [2]). For the upper bound,
the treatment of EETJ in ÎD1, cf. [1] or [22], can easily be modi2ed using the leastness
condition of ID1 to handle name induction.
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